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Abstract 
The study proposes a three stage model of the development of business incubation practices in emerging markets. The 
model addresses the diffusion of incubation practices to new markets, the institutionalization of those practices and the 
co-evolution of incubators and national networks of incubation. The model is based on interviews conducted in Bolivia, 
Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. New incubators in emerging markets often face strong cultural norms and institutional 
impediments to helping entrepreneurs start new businesses. As incubation becomes better established in a country, 
incubators provide more advanced technical, legal and market-based advice. Networks of incubators form to share 
specialized services across many incubators, to allocate government funding to incubators, and to lobby for public and 
private support of innovation.  
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Introduction 
Business incubation encourages new business formation 
and offers the potential to improve emerging market 
economies by improving survival rates and growth of new 
businesses.  A business incubator is defined as “A 
business incubator is a shared office space facility that 
seeks to provide its incubatees with a strategic or value-
adding intervention system of monitoring and business 
assistance.” (Hackett and Dilts, 2004, p. 57). Incubators 
originated as a means to recycle surplus buildings into 
new businesses in order to improve economic 
development (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Incubators 
improve entrepreneurs access to services, decrease the 
start-up costs for new firms, and improve their access to 
markets (iDisc, 2003). Worldwide, there are over 4,000 
incubators (Hackett and Dilts, 2004).  
Although business incubation practices originated in 
developed economies, incubation is now practiced in 
many emerging markets. Cultural and political conditions 
cause variation in the incubation infrastructure and focus. 
By understanding the development of incubators in 
emerging markets, incubator managers, policy makers and 
entrepreneurs can better anticipate the forces that will 
shape their development efforts.  
I propose a three stage model for the development of 
business incubation practices in emerging markets. A key 
feature of the model is the co-evolution of the 
incubators’ capabilities and the creation and elaboration 
of national networks of incubation. The five countries 
studied (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru) have 
created business incubators to encourage and advise 
entrepreneurs how to start new businesses and to 
improve the likelihood that these businesses will survive.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, 
government economic development agencies and private 
foundations encourage incubator formation by providing 
know-how, managerial talent, advising and financial 
support.  
New incubators in emerging markets often face strong 
cultural norms that impede entrepreneurs from starting 
businesses. They also face structural impediments from 
institutions operating in the economy. Incubators provide 
technical, legal and market-based advice. Incubators assist 
entrepreneurs to establish relationships with suppliers 
and customers through contacts through the incubator’s 
organizational networks. Basic business incubation 
practices are common across almost all incubators but 
specialized practices (intellectual property protection, 
engineering design) are unique to specific incubators. The 
development of incubator networks varies significantly 
across the five countries studied.  
Most incubators in this study offered their clients space 
for rent, access to trained business counselors, and 
assistance with funding, all at below market prices 
(ChileHG, 2006; ChileNorth, 2006; PeruIM, 2006; 
ArgentinaCity, 2006; iDisc, 2003). Some incubators were 
too new to have space available but were planning to 
offer space in the future (Bolivia, 2006; ArgentinaCity, 
2006) or were operating as virtual incubators (ChileAI, 
2006). 
Data and Methodology 
The focus of this study was to understand the nature of 
business incubation activities in a portion of South 
America. To plan the study, I first attended the CLADEA 
(Consejo Latinoamericano de Escuelas de 
Administración) conference of business schools in 
Santiago, Chile in October of 2005. I conducted 
exploratory interviews during visits to two incubators at 
Chilean universities (one public and one private 
university), and an interview with a venture capital 
network manager. I was invited to attend the official 
formation of the ChileIncuba incubator network, and 
afterwards met with a founder of Santiago’s first 
incubator who was now an official in CORFO, the 
Chilean government’s economic development agency.  
The countries selected for the study vary in economic, 
social and cultural conditions related to business 
incubation, and in the extent and sophistication of 
incubation activity. In June, July and August of 2006, I 
interviewed managers from business incubators, 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations 
and entrepreneurship educators in the five countries. 
Incubators in each country were selected where possible 
to give a variety of types, locations, sizes, and age 
(ranging from just founded to very experienced). I also 
interviewed officials involved in key government 
incubation financing agencies (CORFO in Chile, SEBRAE 
and ANPROTEC in Brazil). These agencies were 
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particularly helpful in understanding the development of 
national networks of incubation. 
Interviews were usually 1.5 to 2 hours long and followed 
a series of prompts in an emergent style consistent with 
qualitative research procedures used to develop theory 
from case data (Eisenhardt, 1989). The managers 
interviewed were able to direct the conversation into 
areas that they felt were most important or productive. 
Important issues raised in earlier interviews were often 
raised in subsequent interviews to see if experiences and 
views differed.  
Interviews were conducted primarily in English, with 
some in Spanish and to a lesser extent in Portuguese. I 
provided simultaneous translation of Spanish and 
Portuguese responses when needed. To confirm 
translation accuracy, a former business professor from 
Chile reviewed and transcribed several interviews with 
significant amounts of Spanish.  
Table 1 below lists the major interview topics used to 
structure the interviews. Table 2 lists the number of 
interviews by country. Appendix 1 lists the interviews by 
country with their descriptors. These exploratory 
interviews were analyzed for the purposes of building a 
descriptive model. No formal quantitative analyses are 
presented in this study.  Quotes from the interviews 
appear in italics and are not identified with a specific 
interview descriptor to protect confidentiality. 
Most incubators in the countries in the study were 
founded in association with universities and were often 
managed by university faculty (Peru, 2006; Bolivia, 2006; 
Argentina, 2006; Chile, 2006; Brazil, 2006). The most 
relevant interviews are cited although the information 
may have been confirmed in a number of other 
interviews. Representative quotes are taken from select 
interviews to illustrate key points of the model. I have 
edited and where necessary paraphrased interview 
responses for clarity, brevity and to preserve 
confidentiality. 
  
History and affiliations of the incubator
Origins, original sponsors
Funding sources for the incubator and incubatees
Role of stakeholders in creating and operating the incubator
Attitudes toward entrepreneurs and the government
Network affiliations of the incubator
Private-sector role in incubator
Manager and experts employed at the incubator
Sources and qualifications of entrepreneurs
Programs for developing incubatee firms
Degree of specialization by the incubator
Techniques used by the incubator
Services and resources available for incubatees
Sources of revenue for the incubator
Long-term development objectives for the incubator
Table 1. Key incubator interview prompts 
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Argentina  2 1 1 10 to 15 
Bolivia  1 0 0 2 
Brazil  10 0 2 299+** 
Chile  5 1 1 21 
Peru  1 2 1 2 to 5 
Total 19 4 4
*Estimates based on comments from incubator and network managers 
** Estimates based on internal documents and interview comments (Brazil CMP, 2006; Brazil SEB, 2006). 
Table 2. Interviews and estimated number of incubators by country 
 
The analysis that follows describes a model of the 
development of business incubation in emerging 
markets.  Data for the model came from experts from 
five different countries with varied levels of incubation 
practice. The model integrates observations of 
incubation practices with organizational learning, 
diffusion of innovation, institutional and national 
systems of innovation theories. I illustrate the model 
with observations and quotes from the interview data.   
The Model 
I propose that incubation systems in emerging markets 
evolved in stages driven by their clients’ needs for 
services and the choices of their governments for 
economic development. Nelson and Winter (1982) 
identified routines as the key to how economies 
evolve. In the context of business incubation systems, 
pioneering incubators were founded using routines 
imported from foreign NGOs. Using established 
routines from organizations with incubation 
experience served to give these nascent incubators 
legitimacy and helped overcome initial skepticism by 
local sponsors (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) and over 
time the incubators adapted those routines to serve 
local entrepreneurs.  
The three stage of the model are the pioneering stage, 
the operating stage and the advanced stage. Below I 
explain and illustrate each of the three stages of 
incubator development. I describe issues identified by 
incubator professionals that influenced the 
development of the incubators routines and 
capabilities. Each section of the model also discusses 
the co-evolutionary development of incubator 
networks. Incubators form national networks due to a 
number of factors: 
- Budgetary pressures pushed each incubator to 
show efficacy and by use legitimate incubation 
practices. 
- Networks acted as conduits to pass economic 
development aid from the government to 
incubators and on to start-up firms. 
- Sponsors’ required assurance that their resources 
were being used well by incubators. 
- Sharing services across incubators helped 
efficiency. 
- Incubator networks lobbied for government 
reforms and monitored incubator quality.  
Pioneering Stage 
Several incubators interviewed were founded in 
conjunction with international development change 
agents (such as infodev, a World Bank incubation 
sponsor). Once established in a country, the 
pioneering incubators acted as broadcast sources 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Miner and Haunschild, 
1995) further disseminating incubation practices. 
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NGOs seeded new incubators into a country in order 
to promote incubation as a way to improve economic 
development, create employment and increase 
innovation in emerging markets (iDisc, 2003). In this 
study, NGO’s sponsored new incubators in Bolivia and 
Peru. Years earlier a similar process had founded early 
incubators in Brazil and Chile. Universities sponsored 
most of the incubators in this study as a way to 
demonstrate support for government development 
efforts, gain funding, and to fulfill their mission to 
improve national innovative capacity (PeruUniv, 2006; 
ChileHG; CORFO, 2005).  
Copy proven incubation techniques to gain legitimacy. 
The pioneering stage for incubators is characterized by 
the incubator attempting to gain support from its 
environment. Business incubation is an innovation. 
Innovations diffuse into a market more readily if they 
have been shown to provide tangible benefits, 
especially economic advantage over existing 
technologies (Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995). Economic 
advantage is difficult to show for pioneering-stage 
incubators given that it may take over two years for 
the first incubatee firm to enter the marketplace.  
According to institutional theory (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983; March, 1981) one way to gain legitimacy 
is to copy the routines of stakeholders or leading 
organizations in the society. Another key to legitimacy 
is to be effective in achieving valued outcomes. The 
new incubators used proven incubation techniques 
imported from experienced development agencies to 
provide effective incubation. Change agents like infodev 
provided a track record in other countries that 
incubation was an appropriate technology for emerging 
markets.  
Managers of pioneering incubators emphasized that 
successful incubation began with the recruiting of 
clients that are willing to learn, can take direction, and 
have a business idea with some competitive advantage 
(PeruIM, 2006; ChileAN, 2006; ChileAI, 2006; 
ArgentinaDES, 2006). Pioneering incubators worked 
hard at avoiding failures and creating successes so that 
the incubator justified being funded (Bolivia, 2006; 
PeruIM, 2006; ChileNorth; 2006). For this reason, 
pioneering incubators copied the most effective 
incubation routines used by more experienced 
incubators and NGOs (e. g. using business plan 
contests to attract potential incubatees).  
Focus on overcoming cultural biases regarding 
entrepreneurs. Cultural attitudes affect entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to incubate and the image of entrepreneurs 
in society. How entrepreneurship is viewed in a 
society is an important issue for pioneering incubators.  
According to Rogers (1995, pp. 127-128 citing 
Bordenave, (1976) regarding new technology being 
diffused to Latin America) the technology should be 
“appropriate, well proven and adequate for the stage 
of socioeconomic development of the nation.” 
Incubation was seen by some educators and 
foundations as an answer to economic development 
but it was controversial due to a history of 
exploitation by business owners. Several university 
entrepreneurship educators in Peru noted that micro-
entrepreneurs were admired but owners of large 
businesses were regarded with suspicion and 
suppressed entrepreneurs’ desires to participate in 
incubation. They attributed this reluctance to years of 
corrupt governments, domination by foreign 
companies, and resentment of others’ success 
(PeruPRV, 2006; Bolivia, 2006).  
“...we had the same problem with older firms with 
old entrepreneurs, people who are now chairman of 
national, local firms…they are devils! To say that 
you are entrepreneurs here is not good and that’s 
culture. That’s what we want to change to say that 
entrepreneurship is good, to say that you are going 
to get entrepreneurs, that is good, not bad.” 
A Bolivian foundation representative summarized anti-
entrepreneurial attitudes this way: 
“…our president, our ministers, all of them are 
concerned about political issues…they don’t know 
what [an] entrepreneur is, they don’t like 
entrepreneurs because [of] what they think about 
entrepreneurs, they think about the old business 
man that has exploited all the people in Bolivia, and 
that as well [is] a reality here.” 
Finally, activities in Brazil’s social incubators (targeted 
at alleviating poverty and solving social problems) 
(BrazilCMPSOC, 2006) as well as rural incubators in 
Brazil (BrazilMG, 2006) and smaller cities in Chile 
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(ChileNorth, 2006) were similar to the pioneering 
stage incubators in Peru. These social and rural 
incubators were isolated, had difficult times recruiting 
entrepreneurs with good business ideas, or faced 
strong stigmas associated with business owners and 
capitalism (social incubators) in spite of being members 
of sophisticated incubation networks.  
Overcoming low aspiration levels of entrepreneurs of 
necessity. Suspicious attitudes toward entrepreneurs 
and lack of bankruptcy protections all increased the 
risks associated with starting a new business. The net 
effect of these cultural and structural issues was to 
suppress the aspiration levels of potential 
entrepreneurs away from ambitious high profile, high 
growth businesses that incubators seek to serve. 
Interestingly, these suspicions did not suppress the 
widespread desire to start micro-businesses. The 
micro-banks in Bolivia and Peru resulted in many 
willing micro-entrepreneurs, a mixed blessing for 
incubators:  
“And that’s the reality of a poor country here in 
Latin America…I put my own business because I 
want to survive. I can’t get a job so I have to 
survive and that’s the production of the poor 
sector of our economy, why because you see 
your neighbor is working now, selling some chips 
and snacks and say, oh, that could be a good job 
to survive…Today I sell chips; tomorrow I’m 
going to sell some chewing gum and those 
things.”  
 “…they can go to the micro finance institutions 
and get a two hundred dollar loan without a 
guarantee, only signing the contract. I’m going to 
pay the interest rate of 28% but you know I can 
go to buy the chips for 10 cents and sell them 
for 20 cents. I have 100%, I can afford this.” 
Incubator managers referred to the owners of these 
micro-businesses as “entrepreneurs of necessity” 
because the created their businesses to survive an 
economy that had high unemployment. Entrepreneurs’ 
of necessity were regarded as mixed blessings because 
they only employed one person, were often 
“unofficial” (unregistered so they paid no taxes) but 
they did help reduce poverty. The net effect of these 
cultural conditions was that entrepreneurs lowered 
their aspiration levels, resisted growing beyond sole-
proprietorships, and avoided “official” agencies like 
incubators.  
Unfortunately, micro-businesses also competed with 
the pioneer incubators for government financing and 
consumed the incubators’ scarce counseling resources. 
One incubator consultant noted that by helping 
unregistered micro-entrepreneurs who had no desire 
to grow or to become official, he was using 
government resources to help entrepreneurs of 
necessity avoid paying taxes, thereby jeopardizing the 
incubator’s reputation (PeruPRV, 2006). However, to 
ignore these entrepreneurs risked alienating the public 
against the university and the incubator. To avoid this, 
incubators put on public education programs for the 
city government that helped train all entrepreneurs 
(PeruPRV, 2006).  
Confronted by the difficulty of overcoming anti-owner 
biases and low aspiration levels, two managers from 
pioneering incubators expressed almost missionary-like 
determination to help entrepreneurs succeed:  
“You have to compete with Brazilian companies; you 
have to compete with Chilean companies; that is the 
hard work. And we are trying to put this in the minds of 
the entrepreneurs. That is hard work because you have 
to work a lot changing our culture…but you have to do 
it.”  
“We hope that we’re not going to have lots of changes 
[in government policy]…we have to work because the 
people will not wait, the people have to work, the 
people have to export, the people have to eat…so we 
have to not wait…we are still working.”  
To raise entrepreneurs’ aspiration levels, pioneering 
incubators provided high levels of pre-incubation 
services hoping to enable entrepreneurs to grow their 
businesses and create more jobs. Bolivian and Peruvian 
incubators taught entrepreneurs basic business 
planning, management principles, and guided 
entrepreneurs through the government registration 
process. The incubators also worked to find selling 
opportunities for the new ventures to help them be 
able to expand.   
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Pioneering stage networks: Precursors to incubator 
network formation. Networks facilitate learning from 
others’ experiences and provide a basis for building 
political support to obtain resources and advance 
regulatory changes. In Peru, Bolivia and Argentina 
there were no formal national incubation networks. 
Instead, incubators worked in isolation in part due to 
geographic separation (e.g. The incubators in La Paz 
and Santa Cruz in Bolivia knew very little about each 
other). Below I discuss the varied early network 
formation activities in Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. 
In the pioneering stage of incubation, networks do not 
exist or are relatively unimportant to the operation of 
the incubators. The incubators were still trying to 
figure out how to incubate new businesses and how to 
secure resources to pay for their efforts (PeruIM, 
2006; Bolivia, 2006). For example, the Bolivian 
incubation and economic development experts had 
discussed the potential formation of a network in the 
future but it seemed to be a secondary concern given 
the immediate challenges of starting their incubator 
(Bolivia, 2006).    
However, as incubation gained more structure and was 
seen as more legitimate, it attracted more 
entrepreneurs and more sponsorship from government 
and other agencies (CORFO, 2005). Pioneering 
incubators in countries that do not have networked 
incubator systems lose the benefit from the learning 
that can occur from knowledge spillovers (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) as experiences and ideas flow across 
incubators. Capturing knowledge spillovers is one 
reason incubators co-locate their firms, so that the 
clients can interact and build synergies across clients. 
A network can capture these same synergies and 
export them to many incubators but if there is no 
network those experiences do not diffuse throughout 
the national incubation system.  
In the pioneering stage, incubators begin planning how 
to form networks. For example, Peru could have 
copied Chile’s network structure. Peruvian faculty and 
incubator managers interviewed said that they admired 
Chile’s network which had been formed in October, 
2005. However, both Peruvian and Bolivian incubator 
managers would not solicit technical assistance from 
Chile due to the concern that their governments 
would punish them. Their fear stemmed from 
recurring border disputes with Chile resulting from a 
war fought with Chile in the previous century. Instead, 
pioneering stage incubators in Peru and Bolivia relied 
on learning from international NGOs such as infodev as 
well as Colombian and Brazilian incubators.  
Argentina was a different case. Incubators had 
significant funding partly as a political response to the 
unemployment caused by the devaluation of its 
currency several years earlier (ArgentinaDES, 2006). 
Formal networks were not initiated due in part to 
rivalries between the national, state, and city of 
Buenos Aires governments. In spite of the complex 
environment, the need to coordinate activities and the 
driving spirit of incubation managers and economic 
development professionals led to an emergent and 
informal grassroots economic development and 
incubation movement. The group had begun to meet 
periodically several months before my interviews. The 
group was formalizing their meetings and planning to 
become an official trade group that would serve as a 
nucleus to help guide government development policy 
(ArgentinaUniv, 2006).   
Operating Stage 
During this stage, the incubator builds on its track 
record of helping entrepreneurs and selects 
entrepreneurs with higher ambitions. Although some 
pre-incubation activities are always needed, operating 
stage incubators focus on helping clients form strong 
venture management teams (ChileAI, 2006), improving 
their products, and finding funding for expanded 
operations. As their resource commitment to the 
incubatee grows, incubators introduce performance 
measures to hold clients accountable. Below I explain 
the operating stage activities of incubators observed in 
this study. 
More aggressive screening for higher growth 
businesses resulted in incubators with more ambitious 
clients. To serve these clients, operating stage 
incubators began to develop idiosyncratic capabilities. 
For example, two Chilean incubators developed 
significant capabilities in working with technology 
innovations that required engineering and intellectual 
property services.  
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While pioneering incubators focused on developing the 
business concept and initial entry, operating incubators 
focused on commercialization and fostering growth. 
Here are two descriptions of this process:   
“And here are the capacities that we have for 
example: project area that basically helps 
entrepreneurs to get government grants warranty… 
marketing or technological of the unit, …patenting, 
and also looking for associates to do the licensing.”  
“…beginning commercializing, that’s enough for the 
company and after that is ok, the production scaling 
that you need to grow the company and start to sell 
even more than you’re doing it in a very serious 
stage…we can say that this is a very typical curve.” 
Screening resulted in more ambitious ventures that 
needed more resources to reach commercialization 
and thereby creating higher demand funding for 
incubatees. Once incubation has demonstrated 
success, governments desire to magnify the incubators’ 
benefits to the economy and introduce programs to 
fund the early operation of the business. Emerging 
markets are often short of venture capital and 
investors are unwilling to take risks on unknown 
entrepreneurs. The incubator and its sponsors use 
their reputations and relationships to advance their 
incubatees. Government development agencies 
introduce funding programs. For example, CORFO 
developed a clever risk-sharing program for seed 
capital that mixed private and public funds for 
prototyping and early commercialization. Incubators 
received funding to help pay for consulting services but 
had to screen applicants for strong growth potential. 
In the operating stage, incubators had more at stake 
with each client so they developed improved screening 
methods and criteria. A strong selection process 
improved the chances that the venture would be 
competitive. A university incubator with a technology 
focus described their selection routine below:  
“…so now they are looking for projects that they can 
transform into a business. That’s the key…they are 
looking at the whole process of tech transfer as they 
find these ideas that they want to transform into 
businesses, often they find them with their internal 
research people and they develop them into formal 
businesses.”  
Measures of incubator and incubatee success. 
Operational incubators develop capabilities that 
address the key issues of their incubatee firms and 
their sponsors. As the firms at this level are screened 
more vigorously for competitive advantage and growth 
potential, the incubators have to provide more 
assistance with funding, production, marketing and 
intellectual property protection. Funders’ expectations 
will lead to the development of measures of incubator 
performance.  
Key outcomes for pioneering incubators included the 
number of firms in pre-incubation, the number of 
business plans completed, and applications submitted 
to sponsors for start-up funding (ChileNorth, 2006). In 
the operating stage the incubatee is to have gone 
beyond a prototype to selling on a regular basis and 
generating funds to help pay for some incubation 
services. An operating stage incubator manager 
described two key measures he used to judge 
incubator success: 
“one is number of companies [graduated from the 
incubator]; another one is have we been at least 
even with our resources? We did not lose, or giving 
more money, we’re even.” 
Operating stage incubators did not have the “anti-
entrepreneur” cultural issues that pioneering 
incubators confronted. However, lack of bankruptcy 
laws and the heavy social stigma of declaring 
bankruptcy increasingly impacted operating stage 
incubators in their dealings with potential incubatees. 
Incubators worked actively to avoid or prevent 
bankruptcy by screening ventures and owners more 
closely and using higher metrics for expected revenues 
in deciding which firms to incubate. Bankrupt clients 
hurt the incubator’s reputation as well as that of its 
sponsors (ArgentinaUniv, 2006). Entrepreneurs 
invested significant personal resources into the start-
ups and worried that they might go bankrupt which 
could limit their future career prospects. For example, 
consider this response to the question: Is there a 
bankruptcy procedure?  
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“No…it’s not regulated. You can’t say now I’m back 
to nothing…we don’t have that legal procedure for 
that. For example, it’s culture as well because in the 
States, I think when you say ok, I have problem and 
I go bankrupt, you have earned some experiences 
and you are not going to do the same. And the 
system see you that ok, you are not going to do the 
same, you are going to have another opportunity but 
here, you’ve got a bankrupt…You are a devil, you 
don’t exist.” 
Operating stage network capabilities. Prior to forming 
a network, specialized capabilities such as expertise in 
intellectual property or in certain forms of engineering 
were not used by other incubators except on an 
occasional basis. (ChileDCT, 2006; BrazilCMP, 2006). 
Incubators derived value from serving their clients and 
responding to their needs. Pressures to spread these 
services were applied by government and other 
sponsors in part through the use of budget allocations.  
As incubation infrastructure grew, the incubators and 
those supporting them developed coordinating 
mechanisms. To satisfy their government and 
institutional sponsors (usually universities) incubators 
spread expenses across as many incubatees as possible. 
Incubators with unique capabilities provided those 
services to other incubators informally in the 
operating stage. However, the cooperative contacts 
with other incubators (Etzkowitz,  et al., 2005) 
(BrazilANP, 2006; BrazilCMP, 2006) helped reinforce 
the value of formalized exchange processes in the 
incubation networks.  
In the operating stage, incubation networks are 
negotiated and formed.  ChileIncuba’s formation was a 
good example, originating after a period of 
independent incubation. Chile’s incubators wanted to 
band together to negotiate with the government for 
better venture funding and to share resources 
(CORFO, 2005) (ChileHG, 2006).  Some incubators in 
the system had advanced capabilities and could bring 
considerable knowledge to the other incubators. 
However, there was still an atmosphere of rivalry and 
competition among the incubator members making 
performance measures a potential future problem 
(ChileAI, 2006; CORFO, 2005; ChileNorth, 2006).  
 
Advanced Stage 
Advanced stage incubators engage more intensely and 
more often in a number of issues that are noticeably 
different than confronted in earlier stages. The 
capabilities of advanced incubators must serve clients 
that are technically sophisticated and have growth 
potential. Development of capabilities was a function 
of both individual incubator goals and skills as well as 
the co-evolution of the capabilities in the incubator 
network and government support systems for 
investment (Nelson, 1993).  
In the advanced stage, incubators are still focused on 
finding firms to incubate however the expectations of 
the firm and the entrepreneur by the incubator are 
more demanding. Eligible firms must pass significant 
hurdles in terms of having a clear competitive 
advantage, potential for securing intellectual property 
protection, willingness to form a strong venture team, 
and eligibility to obtain initial capital investment often 
through an incubator network administered funding 
initiative. One incubator manager described it this way: 
“…we are a technology based incubator…it’s 
technology in the very wide sense of the word. What 
I mean is we are basically focusing on innovation. It 
can be innovation in technology, or in business 
models but the most important thing is the business 
must have some sustainable competitive 
advantages…Intellectual properties is not the only 
requirement, we have received some projects that 
don’t have intellectual properties protection but 
have…several resources that create this entry 
barrier…” 
A number of advanced incubators took equity 
positions in exchange for their incubation services. 
Advanced incubators with equity stakes in ventures 
were effectively managing an investment portfolio of 
formerly incubated companies. This was a choice made 
by the entrepreneur and the incubator in part to 
ensure a continuing relationship with the incubator 
after the firm graduates to independence (ChileDCT, 
2006; BrazilBIO, 2006; ChileAI, 2006).  
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“We had some examples [of start-ups] in different 
industries, not a very particular focus but all of 
these companies involve engineering 
knowledge/services, and they started as different 
departments and then…they were spun out and 
went independently out into the market and the 
incubator has an equity ownership in the 
companies.”  
Advanced incubators usually had incubated more firms 
and larger firms. Their staff were also more specialized 
in order to provide more sophisticated services and to 
manage their government and incubator network 
relationships (usually done by the incubator manager in 
operating incubators). Finding investment capital and 
managing government grants demanded much more 
effort than during the operating stage. One incubator 
manager described their staffing as follows: 
“Incubation is [Name]who takes the lead in the 
typical work of incubation: legal support, managing 
the process of incubation and investment. I take the 
lead in finance investment, it’s when they need 
some private fundings. What we try to do is to find 
a strategy to create the biggest company as possible 
before involving outside investors or angel 
networks.” 
Specialization of incubators. In advanced systems, 
specialized incubators emerge to serve a particular 
industry, technology, sponsoring organization or 
delivery of a particular service. For example, an 
incubator in Brazil focused exclusively on 
biotechnology, another focused on innovations in the 
advanced electronics industry and yet another focused 
on faculty innovations from a large university. In one 
software incubator, 80% of its clients were faculty and 
students from its sponsoring university (BrazilSoft1, 
2006). Further specialization in incubation occurred 
when the government created funding for “social” 
incubators targeted to alleviate poverty in marginalized 
populations through formation of cooperatives and 
collectives (Etzkowitz, et al., 2006; BrazilAN, 2006; 
BrazilCMPSOC, 2006).  
Even the largest incubators often do not have enough 
incubatees to justify maintaining special capabilities for 
their incubator alone. Sharing specialized services set 
off internal competition in national networks between 
incubators wanting to secure preferred treatment 
from the funding agencies. Special skills could help 
their incubators gain importance in the networks and 
ensure their incubator’s ability to survive periodic 
government funding cuts. Shared services frequently 
included intellectual property law (patenting and 
licensing), scientific testing and analysis, and 
engineering services. Incubators actively lobbied the 
network administrators to be service providers to 
network members (BrazilBIO, 2006; BrazilCMP, 2006; 
CORFO, 2006; ChileHG, 2006).  
“we don’t have enough of the kind of products to 
support our licensing technology office itself for each 
university…so there are several universities 
bidding…to do licensing and we are considered as 
one of the alternatives [i.e. possible choices to do 
the licensing].”  
Advanced stage incubator network capabilities. In the 
advanced stage, incubators are facing higher demands 
from their more sophisticated incubatees and must 
either develop capabilities or find them elsewhere. 
Networks institutionalize collaboration between 
incubators by establishing who will specialize and how 
they will be compensated. An increased demand for 
funding has the network coordinating the development 
of new funding initiatives, and negotiating with 
government agencies and international funders 
(BrazilSEB, 2006). Finally, the networks face increased 
scrutiny from their regulators resulting in development 
of performance measures. These measures encourage 
incubator efficiency and effectiveness. The network 
uses its coercive strength (ability to withhold 
resources) to impose these measures on the 
incubators. Below are my observations of advanced 
stage networks:  
Networks allow for the new incubators to benefit 
from the recycling of knowledge from the pioneering 
incubators in the form of routines, technology, and 
processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986). In 
general, transfer of knowledge can occur through 
indirect observation of spillovers (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), the movement of employees 
(Robinson and Miner, 1996), or imitation of practices 
of other organizations (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
the advanced stage knowledge flows in part through 
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2010, Volume 5, Issue 3 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org ) 11 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios 
the systematic transfer of personnel for temporary or 
permanent assignments, including service to the 
network itself in centralized networks (BrazilSEB, 
2006). In one Brazilian network, incubator managers 
were required to move to different incubators every 
three years (assuming the manager effective enough to 
be wanted by another incubator) (BrazilNetwork, 
2006; BrazilMG, 2006).  
The national incubator networks acted as coordinating 
mechanisms to spread effective incubation practices 
and also helped the incubators magnify their influence 
on national policies. For example, ChileIncuba 
coordinated the exchange of best practices across its 
members (CORFO, 2005). In Brazil, ANPROTEC 
functioned as a trade group for incubators and 
sponsored educational conferences for incubator 
managers.  
During this stage, governments introduced funding 
programs focused on firms that were commercializing 
their products and services. Advanced incubators used 
mixed funding sources (private sector, government and 
foundations) (BrazilCMP, 2006; BrazilSEB, 2006; 
Etzkowitz, et al, 2005) to support their operations.  
Networks used calls for proposals to induce 
incubators to put forward clients for investment to 
increase “deal flow” (i.e. the creation of new ventures 
available for investment). Low deal flow discouraged 
private sector venture financing of incubatee firms 
because there were few lucrative firms that would 
support venture financing (BrazilANP, 2006; BrazilSEB, 
2006). Chile had a two-stage investment program 
providing early business planning and prototyping 
support, and later support for expansion and 
commercialization (CORFO, 2006).  An advanced 
incubator in Chile was spearheading the creation of an 
angel investor network to build investment in 
incubatees (ChileAN, 2005; ChileAI, 2006).  
Introduction of performance measures at the network 
level. Resistance to network formation can be 
significant. The incubator fears losing control to the 
network managers. Incubator performance evaluations 
by the network began as a way to spread best 
practices and establish milestones for incubatee and 
incubator performance (BrazilNetwork, 2006). These 
performance measures diffused by having respected 
incubator managers develop and promote (Rogers, 
1995) the new measures at annual incubation 
conferences (BrazilCMP, 2006). For example, the 
Brazilian network counted the number of incubatees 
and graduated firms in its performance measures. 
Some incubators objected to these measures because 
they did not value quality (high growth ventures with 
large sales) but instead valued quantity (small low 
growth businesses). The measures were changed 
(BrazilNetwork, 2006; BrazilANP, 2006) By linking 
funding to incubator performance on these measures, 
the networks effectively coerced incubators to mimic 
network policies (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Network managers predicted that resistance to 
evaluations would fade as the incubators began to take 
them for granted (March, 1981).   
Brazil required reporting of performance indicators 
(e.g. incubatee gross sales receipts, tax revenue from 
those sales, and the number of jobs created by 
incubatees) and used incentives to reward strong 
performance (BrazilCIE, 2006). Regional and national 
networks used performance data to show that their 
incubators were returning value-added for their 
countries. Comparability of performance across 
networks increased pressures to clone the best 
performing incubators and trim the worst to save 
costs. Not surprisingly, incubator managers welcomed 
the use of indicators if their incubator performed well 
but feared them if the incubator was a “poor” 
performer (BrazilSOC, 2006; BrazilNetwork, 2006).  
Conclusion 
Business incubation practices in emerging market 
nations vary in the extent of their diffusion as well as 
the variety of incubators that are operating in each 
country. By performing interviews in several countries 
that had differing levels of incubation capabilities I was 
able to see the differences and similarities across 
incubators as well as the national networks of business 
incubation that were forming or had formed in those 
countries. 
The study proposes an empirical model that integrates 
observed business incubation practices with diffusion 
of innovation, organizational learning and institutional 
theories. The model addresses the specific stages of 
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evolutionary development of the diffusion of business 
incubation and the development of national incubation 
networks. The stages are illustrated with examples of 
relevant practices or conditions from each of the five 
countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru. 
Table 3 below summarizes key observations. 
 
Incubation Characteristics Network Characteristics 
    
Bolivia (early pioneering stage)   
- Pioneering incubators just developing - Idea of having a network discussed 
- Pre-incubation focus - No coordination of incubation policy  
- Focus on encouraging entrepreneurs - Little effort to exchange services or learning
- Low level of government support 
Peru (pioneering in transition to operating stage) 
- Pioneering incubators transitioning to operating 
level 
- Initial steps for network formation 
- Pre-incubation focus - Incubators collaborating and meeting 
- Entrepreneurs of necessity competing for 
resources 
- No formal structure but working on plan
- Government supportive but low funding
Argentina (mixed pioneer /operating stage) 
- Incubators at all three levels - Informal incubation meetings – no network
- Government development policy fragmented - Grassroots network movement emerging from 
economic development meetings 
- Incubators screen out entrepreneurs of necessity 
in favor of higher growth clients 
- Government struggling with complex rules
seems unable to organize networks 
Chile (operating moving to advanced) 
- Most incubators at operating level - Newly formed network
- Newest incubators are at pioneer level - Incubators created the network  
- Government sponsored funding for incubatees - Funding programs aid incubators and clients
  - Angel investment network newly formed
Brazil (advanced with multiple networks)   
- Mixed levels with most at operating level - Top-down control of incubators 
- Advanced incubators specialized by industry - Networks spread best practices 
- Sophisticated services offered by advanced 
incubators to others 
- Funding programs administered through 
networks 
- Blended government and private financing 
program 
- Multiple networks formed to serve general 
incubators, industry specific incubators 
Table 3. Network descriptions by country 
The results of this study indicate that there is a 
progression for the development of incubation practices in 
emerging markets, but it is a varied and complex 
progression. Cultural factors influence the acceptance of 
incubation by potential entrepreneurs. Early specialization 
by certain incubators shapes the incubation networks’ 
capabilities to assist entrepreneurs. As networks develop, 
incubators must demonstrate their ability to graduate 
successful firms into the market. 
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Incubation networks evolve from the “bottom-up” to 
serve the needs of the incubators. As the network matures 
and the incubators need more resources to provide their 
clients extensive financial and technical support, the 
national government provides added funding and 
partnerships with venture capital providers emerge. In 
turn, government sponsors and investors demand more 
accountability and demonstrable economic development 
outcomes such as increased employment, tax revenues, 
etc.  Because of their increasing investment (both financial 
and political) in incubator success, the government exerts 
stronger influence over the incubator network and the 
network becomes a more top-down regulator of incubator 
activity.  
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Appendix 1 
Interviews were conducted in October, 2005 and June through August 2006 and are cited in parentheses using a Country 
name, a descriptor and the year of the interview. Specific names are not used to ensure the anonymity of the 
interviewees. 
1) ArgentinaCity, Incubator Manager(s). July, 2006. 
2) ArgentinaDES, Incubator Manager(s). July, 2006. 
3) ArgentinaEND, Private Venture Capital Foundation. July, 2006.  
4) ArgentinaUniv., University Entrepreneurship Educator(s). July, 2006 
5) Bolivia, Incubator Manager(s) and private foundation. June, 2006. 
6) BrazilANP, Incubator Trade Association Official(s). July/August, 2006. 
7) BrazilCDT, Incubator Manager(s). July/August, 2006. 
8) BrazilBIO, Incubator Manager(s). July/August, 2006. 
9) BrazilNetwork, Incubator Network Manager(s). July/August, 2006. 
10) BrazilMG, Incubator Managers. July/August, 2006. 
11) BrazilSEB, Brazilian Economic Development Official(s). July/August, 2006. 
12) BrazilCMP, University Incubator, Official(s). July/August, 2006. 
13) BrazilCMPSOC, Social Incubator Manager(s). July/August, 2006. 
14) BrazilSoft1, Software Incubator Manager(s). July/August, 2006. 
15) BrazilBRSSOC, Social Incubator Manager(s) (public university affiliation). July/August, 2006. 
16) BrazilRF SOC, Social Incubator Manager (with religious affiliation). July/August, 2006. 
17) ChileUC, University incubator, Official(s). June, 2006. 
18) ChileDCT, University Incubator (engineering oriented) Official(s). June, 2006. 
19) ChileAI, University Entrepreneurship Professor, Official(s). June, 2006. 
20) ChileHG, Incubator Manager(s). June, 2006. 
21) ChileAN, Incubator Manager(s). October 2005 and June, 2006. 
22) ChileNorth, Incubator Manager(s). June, 2006. 
23) CORFO, Economic Development Official(s). October, 2005. 
24) CORFO, Economic Development Official(s). June, 2006. 
25) PeruIM, Incubator Manager(s). June, 2006.  
26) PeruUniv., Entrepreneurship Educator(s). June, 2006.  
27) PeruPRV, University Entpreneurship Educators (private university). June, 2006.  
